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NORMAN DANIELS*
I want to bring a somewhat different perspective to the discussion of
recent U.S. health reform from the focus of this Symposium. My field is in
justice and health policy. I'm not a lawyer, and I'm not going to try to
pretend to be. And, although I chair an ethics concentration for the Health
Policy Ph.D. at Harvard, my work in policy is not quantitative. Primarily, I
want to discuss the ethics of health reform.
One of the foci of concern has to do with the number of people in the
U.S. who are uninsured. I want to take up the question: "Why should we
care about who is missing coverage?"--which was the focus of the
Affordable Care Act. I want to emphasize that we are talking about
roughly fifty-one million people who are uninsured,' and this is a number
that has increased by fifty percent since the Clinton efforts at reform in the
early 1990s.2 This population of fifty-one million people is larger than the
nation of South Korea, a middle income country that instituted universal
coverage years ago.3 The second issue I want to discuss is the efficiency of
the American system and the high cost of health care in the United States.
4
I will address why we should think about efficiency as an ethical issue and
not simply as an economic concern. Finally, even with our very significant
spending on health care, we still cannot meet all of our nation's health
needs. This is a general problem across the world. Every country
struggles with how best to utilize resources that are insufficient to cover all
of its health care needs.
Before I discuss issues particular to the United States and how the
*Mary B. Saltonstall Professor of Population Ethics and Professor of Ethics and Population
Health, Harvard School of Public Health.
'Tim Mullaney, Protests Spotlight a Stressed Middle Class: Slumping Wages, Rising Health
Costs Cause Strain, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2011, at B1.
2 Norman Daniels & Marc Roberts, Health Care Reform, HASTINGS CTR.,
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Publications/BriefingBook/Detail.aspx?id=2180 (last visited Feb. 21,
2012).
3 See id; Soonman Kwon, Thirty Years of National Health Insurance in South Korea: Lessons for
Achieving Universal Health Care Coverage, 24 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 63 (2009).
4 The Cost of Care, NAT'L GEO. (Dec. 18, 2009), http://blogs.ngm.com/blog central/2009/12/the-
cost-of-care.html (showing that the United States spends more than twice the international average on
health care per citizen); US. Health Care Costs, KAISEREDU.ORG, www.kaiseredu.org/lssue-
Modules/US-Health-Care-Costs/Background-Brief.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) (noting that the
United States spent nearly $2.6 trillion on health care in 2010).
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reform might address them in some cases, I want to talk about what justice
requires in the provision of health and health care in society. I first ask a
general question: What do we owe each other? I then divide this general
question into three sub-questions. I also want to speak about the
implications for health protection of the answers that I give to the three
sub-questions. Finally, I will briefly touch upon ethical issues in health
reform.
The first sub-question, to the general question about what we owe each
other as a matter of justice, is why is health of special moral importance?
What actually drew me into the area of health (from a more general
orientation on justice) was the idea that all developed countries in the
world had robust forms of universal coverage, despite the fact that there
were many kinds of other inequalities that those countries celebrated and
did not oppose. Why distribute health care equitably when other goods are
so differently distributed? This is how I thought about the question
originally.
The second question, then, is why are health inequalities unjust? The
third question is how can we meet health needs fairly when we cannot
meet them all? I originally thought that these two questions were answered
by my answer to the first question; however, one of the things that I have
learned over the last couple of decades was the naivet6 of that viewpoint;
that is, we actually need more independent answers to these questions.
These questions arise independently, or in addition to, the issue about
universal coverage. Every society, whether it has universal health care or
not, has a problem of using its resources to meet health needs, and even
countries with universal coverage have significant health inequalities. We
need to know when those inequalities are unjust. Furthermore, justice
requires us to allocate the resources fairly among people even if we are not
meeting other requirements of justice, such as the provision of universal
coverage.
Now, I said that there are three questions, instead of one. In a book I
wrote about twenty years ago, I thought I had answered the first question in
a way that had also answered the other two questions.5 My answer to the
first question is that health is morally important because of its impact on
the opportunities we can have in life. And then I thought, perhaps in the
grips of a false myth about health care and its social importance, that if the
main determinant of health in a population is health care, broadly
understood to include traditional public health measures, then unequal
access to health care, including unequal provision of those public health
measures to parts of the population, would be the main way in which we
get inequality.
5NoRMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 56-58 (1985).
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But I now think, following some of the social epidemiology literature,
that there are actually many sources of inequality in health in a society-
the distribution of many determinants of health that affect the health of the
population. And if that is true, then inequalities in health are not only
about injustice in the distribution of health care. That may be one reason,
but there are other reasons as well.
The answer to the third question I also thought followed answers to the
first two. I thought that if health was important, especially because of its
impact on opportunity, then we could decide which health needs were most
important simply by their relative impact on opportunities. But, it turns out
that the story is much more complicated and reasonable people will
disagree about how to distribute the goods that meet the health needs of
society. So I began to think that we needed a different kind of answer from
the one I had given.
My basic-and unrevised-idea is based on the simple intuition that if
we take a notion like normal functioning in society, then disease and
disability, or pathology more generally, can be thought of as departures
from normal functioning. If we understand that departures from normal
functioning can lead to more deficits in things that we can do or be, then
what we have done is create an account of the range of opportunities that
we lose as a result of disease and ill-health. So, if you think society has
some social obligation to protect opportunity and its distribution, then you
have a framework for thinking about justice and health care, or health more
generally.
I borrow my justification for why we might think that we have an
obligation to protect opportunity from more general theories ofjustice. For
example, in the early 1970s John Rawls published what has probably
emerged as the most important piece of literature in legal and political
philosophy in the twentieth century, a book called A Theory of Justice.6
Very modest--a theory of justice.
It is a contractarian view that says that we need to decide what a fair
choice situation is from which we can select fair terms of cooperation from
society. Rawls made a simplifying assumption: namely that everyone who
participated in this choice situation was fully functional over a normal life
span. In effect, nobody gets sick; nobody dies early. This simplification
was pounced upon by a number of people, including two Nobel
economists, Amartya Sen and, earlier, Kenneth Arrow.
Arrow asked: What kind of a theory is this? It does not even tell us
6 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
7 1d. at 14.
8 AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 103 (2009); Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-
Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory of Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 245 (1973) (book review).
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who is worse off, a rich but sick person or a poor but healthy one. 9 Truly,
if welfare is to count, we can look at how well off the individuals are and
answer that question. But Rawls simplified his theory so he was not
talking about health. Of course, it is not that he never wanted to talk about
it. Rather, he put that off as a second stage or extension of the theory.
In his theory, Rawls wanted to say that we measure inequalities
between people by how well off they are by reference to an index of
"primary social goods"-all-purpose means that include income, wealth,
opportunities, liberties, and rights.' He then decided that in the choice
situation he was describing, which was hypothetical and involved what
became known as the "veil of ignorance,"'" deliberators would choose two
fundamental principles of justice: first, to distribute basic liberties equally
to all people; and second, to arrange social and economic inequalities to
everyone's advantage while at the same time keeping positions of
responsibility and authority accessible to all. 12 The second principle has
two clauses.' 3 The first says that we should require jobs and offices be
open to everyone (this is the equality of opportunity clause), and the
second that we should compress inequalities in a significant way, allowing
only inequalities that make the worst off as well off as possible.
14
This general theory of justice did not talk about health, but I have tried
to extend it by broadening the notion of opportunity in such a way that we
can capture the concerns we have about people's motivation to protect
health. And Rawls bought into this. Nevertheless, one of his critics,
Amartya Sen, tried to suggest that this account did not quite capture what
we ought to be concerned about when we are concerned about equality.' 5 I
think it does, 16 and Professor Sen and I have had a lot of discussion over
9 Arrow, supra note 8, at 251-52.
1o RAWLS, supra note 6, at 92.
1 See id. at 136-37 (explaining the basic assumption of his theory, namely that "parties are
situated behind a veil of ignorance" such that "[t]hey do not know how the various alternatives will
affect their own particular case and they are obligated to evaluate principles solely on the basis of
general considerations").
121d. at 60-61.
13 See id. at 83 (describing the two clauses of the "difference principle," which provides that
"[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of
the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity").
14 See id. at 83-84 (commenting on the "principle of fair equality of opportunity" and describing
the rationale of maintaining open positions as "express[ing] the conviction that if some places were not
open on a basis fair to all, those kept out would be right in feeling unjustly treated even though they
benefited from the greater efforts of those who were allowed to hold them").
15 See AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 77 (1992) ("The definitional exclusion
contained in Rawls's 'political conception' limits the scope of the concept of justice drastically and
abruptly, and it would often make it hard to identify political rights and wrongs that a theory of justice
should address.").
16 Norman Daniels, Capabilities, Opportunity, and Health, in MEASURING JUSTICE: PRIMARY
GOODS AND CAPABILITIES 131, 131-49 (2010).
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this.
This brings us to the second question of justice: When is a health
inequality between socioeconomic or other demographic groups unjust? A
thesis I will mention briefly is that the principles of justice, as described
above, capture the key social determinants of health that we know about
from the social epidemiological literature. More equitable distribution of
income and fair participation in the political process can reduce the
inequalities in health status across the population."
An interesting figure identifies one line of argument about wealth and
health.' 8 The dots represent countries, the horizontal axis indicates the per
capita gross domestic product, and the vertical axis shows the life
expectancy at birth. What you see is a rapidly rising curve, which is
generally interpreted to mean that the gross domestic product per capita, a
crude measure of average income, has some effect on the health of the
population, but only up to a certain modest level-approximately six to
eight thousand dollars per capita-which is representative of the lower end
of middle income countries. Beyond that income range, the curve tends to
level.
But there is another feature of the graph that deserves attention: the
variation among equally poor countries on the left side of the graph. The
implication is that equally poor countries might have different policies
about how they pursue the distribution and use of their resources, and that
this may have a different effect on health.
Cuba, for example, has a life expectancy roughly equal to the United
States, despite being much, much poorer than the United States, to say
nothing of being the focus of economic attacks by the United States for
decades. The state of Kerala, in India, is much poorer even than Cuba, but
its health measures are the best of any state in India, and rival those of
richer developed countries. How is that possible? What this says to me is
that policy differences across countries matter a lot. What you see in the
graph are countries with a lot of variation in health outcomes, even among
wealthy countries. It is a well-known fact that the United States ranks only
about fiftieth in life expectancy in the world. 19  Even among other
industrial countries the United States does not compare well. This can be
attributed to several factors. In particular, significant economic inequality
in the United States produces health inequalities, and that means that
17 Norman Daniels et al., Why Justice is Good for Our Health: The Social Determinants of Health
Inequalities, DAEDALUS, Fall 1999, at 215, 241-42.
'8 See Norman Daniels et al., Health and Inequality, or, Why Justice is Good for Our Health, in
PUBLIC HEALTH, ETHICS, AND EQUITY 63, 66 fig.4.1 (Sudhir Anand et al., eds. 2004) (illustrating the
relationship between country wealth and life-expectancy).
19 The World Factbook Life Expectancy at Birth, CIA.GOV, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
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economically disadvantaged people in the United States have a lower heath
status and that equals out to a lower life expectancy.
Nonetheless, life expectancy is really somewhat independent of
universal coverage as an issue. The Whitehall Studies in the United
Kingdom are illustrative. Whitehall is the headquarters for the British
Civil Service. Starting about twenty years after the introduction of
universal coverage in Britain, people began to ask the questions: What
difference does universal coverage make? Is it reducing health inequalities
in society? Whitehall then began large studies of typical parts of the
population, including all the workers in the British Civil Service.20
What is striking about these data is that these are all individuals with
universal coverage in the British health care system. They are all people
who are not so poor that they are deprived, regardless of their occupations.
They are people with basic levels of education, and yet, researchers found
what is called a socioeconomic gradient of health. People with almost
twice the relative mortality rate, but who are in the blue-collar group fared
much worse in longevity and health status than people who are in the best-
off groups-administrative occupations consisting of professionals,
executives, and clerical workers. This forms a socioeconomic gradient of
health.
Put into words, that gradient says something like, "the richer you are,
or the higher your occupational status, the longer and healthier your life."
That kind of gradient is present in every age group in the study in the
United Kingdom.21 It is also found in every country in the world where it
has been measured. This is a very robust finding, and one that no one
challenges, so then the questions become: What is causing it? Why are we
getting this result? This socioeconomic gradient of health is, after all, just
a correlation; it doesn't show causation. Some part of the gradient may be
explained by sicker people being selected for lower status and worse
paying jobs, but that is not the majority of the story, especially if the
gradient includes education and occupational status rather than just
income.
If we go back to my earlier thesis and look at those three principles of
justice that Rawls said came out of his theory,22 we actually get a model for
what health would look like for one part of the world, given the
distribution of some of the social determinants. But what I did not mention
was some of the data about what those determinants are. They include
things like income and wealth inequality in society, educational inequality,
20 M. G. Marmot et al., Employment Grade and Coronary Heart Disease in British Civil Servants,
32 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 244 (1978).
2" Id. at 245 fig.1.
22 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 266 (enumerating his three principles ofjustice as: (1) equal basic
liberties; (2) constraints on inequalities; and (3) equal opportunities).
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inequality in participation in political activities, lack of access to health or
health care, and inequalities in that access depending on wealth. What one
finds in every country are variations in the distribution of these kinds of
goods, and they produce health inequalities in those societies.
What I am suggesting is that if you had a just social arrangement, it
would shrink the inequalities, flatten the socioeconomic gradient, and it
might in fact help improve the overall health level of the population by
improving the bottom line. That would be a very good outcome if it were
true. The way I think of this is through the slogan "social justice is good
for our health."
Another issue concerns meeting health needs fairly when we cannot
meet them all. We have an enormous ethical controversy about how to
distribute health care resources. It is illustrated, for example, in the strong
public reaction that sometimes is triggered when countries will fairly and
firmly try to adhere to a rationing principle, such as the claim that we
should only include services that are effective (and safe) in our benefit
packages. All countries have this issue, which is basically a distinction
23between proven and unproven treatments.
The basic idea is that we should only distribute things that we know
work. That is, we should not be engaged in distributing things that might
not work at all, or might harm people. That principle has a lot of
plausibility, but when it comes down to excluding, for example, a child
dying of cancer from an experimental therapy that is not entirely proven,
some people will say "let's try it." That already pits values against each
other: conserving resources in order to be used in a broader way by the
population and to help as many people as possible, versus the
compassionate use of scarce resources to try a last-chance therapy for an
individual.
People will trade these values in different ways, depending on who
they are, and that is what I mean by reasonable disagreement. We do not
have a clear agreement on how to allocate resources for proven and
unproven treatments. What I am suggesting is that we need a fair process,
and a lot of my colleagues dislike this part of my proposal, because it says
that professors sitting in armchairs cannot answer all the questions, at least
not in a reasonable time. The basic idea is that we need a form of
procedural justice to address the reasonable disagreements people have
about how to allocate resources. My answer to this question-how can we
meet health care needs fairly when we cannot meet them all?-is to create
a fair process to adjudicate disputes. That is my version of what Sarah
23 For discussion on this issue in the United States, see NORMAN DANIELS & JAMES SABIN,
SETrING LIMITS FAIRLY: CAN WE LEARN TO SHARE MEDICAL RESOURCES 67-84 (2002).
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Palin calls the "death panels., 24 I think we should instead call them the
''access to life panels."
The general implication of this account is that access to life panels
serve to protect opportunity by promoting and protecting population health,
and that this is a social obligation that we have. So I want to borrow the
obligation to protect opportunity from more general accounts of justice.
The social obligation implies adequate protections against risk, and I think
it implies universal coverage, that is equitably financed. This obligation to
protect opportunity is what underlies the special moral importance of
health and health care.
Turning to my second question about justice and health, I think justice
also requires the elimination of unjust health inequalities. I do not think
the current reform proposal addresses this issue in a significant way. It
turns out that access to health care, while of some importance in
distributing health, is dwarfed in its importance by other social
determinants of health. Unless one was dealing with a comprehensive
reform that made other things more equal in the United States-the
distribution of education, the distribution of income and wealth, and so
on--only then would worse off groups have more access to health. This is
not to say universal coverage is not an important goal-the first point says
it is, just that it is not a singular solution.
The last question I raised about justice and health is: What does it
mean to say that we might have a right to health or health care? I think it
means that health, or health care, is a special case of a right to equality of
opportunity in society. Protecting health is one way to assure that people
have a fair distribution of opportunities. Obviously it is not the only one-
income, wealth, and other things affect the opportunity gradient-but
health does too. If one asks: What should your entitlements be? with
regard to health or health care, my suggestion is that we should use a
deliberative democratic process to arrive at what those entitlements consist
of, especially given the resources and technological capabilities that we
have and the distribution of competing needs in a particular society. That
is a fairly abstract answer, though.
Let me return, by way of conclusion, to some of the issues with which
we started. In the United States, there are around fifty-one million people
lacking health insurance. The number was forty-six million before the
recession, and roughly fifty-one million now. If we look at the outcome
of the Affordable Care Act, it turns out that it covers between roughly
thirty-two and thirty-four million people, at our best estimates, and leaves
24 See Jane Gross, How Medicare Fails the Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2011, at SR8 (noting
Palin's characterization); Manoj Jain, Like Patients, Doctors are Loath to Accept Death, WASH. POST,
Oct. 18, 2011, at E5 (same).
25 Mullaney, supra note 1.
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out many immigrants and undocumented individuals. 26  Is this fair?
Should we close this gap permanently, in order to get this universal
coverage? If we ask the legal question about the Affordable Care Act and
its individual mandate, then we are talking about the specific context of the
Affordable Care Act. A more basic issue is whether we should ethically
adopt a reform that guarantees universal coverage, and that is what most of
my argument has addressed. I am not a lawyer, though I have my opinion
about the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. I hope the Act is
constitutional because it is now the only politically available way to
provide access to coverage in this, the largest privately-based insurance
country. If you had publicly funded insurance, using social security as a
model, the whole issue of an individual mandate goes away, because
everybody already has coverage, and because there is a mandate to pay
taxes. That is, the worries about why you need an individual mandate in a
private system go away because in a private system you are worried about
adverse selection, where individuals, who for some reason do not want to
get insured or they think they are going to pay too much for insurance
given their possible health needs, might not want to participate. They
might be free riders and they might expect that when they do need health
care, the public will step up to the plate and cover them.
So in a private system, the fear of insurers is this concern about
adverse selection. How do you guard against it? Well one way is through
an individual mandate. Let me remind you there was a spirited debate
about whether there ought to be a publicly funded provision in this health
reform-although there never was a serious single payer proposal on the
agenda for public debate during the reform effort. Even the much weaker
public component of a reform was rejected in the political process, and so
we were pushed to a private system in which an individual mandate is
necessary. If you asked the American public, do they want a system in
which nobody is excluded because of prior conditions, they all would
almost overwhelmingly say yes. But you cannot have that in a private
insurance scheme unless you have an individual mandate. For example,
Germany has a mixed public and private system and everybody is required
to have some kind of coverage or other.27 That kind of coverage is a
mandate, in effect.
The ethical issue here stems from the fact that we do need an
individual mandate in order to avoid free riders and adverse selection
(health people do not get insurance but others cover their needs when they
26 CBO's Analysis of the Major Heath Care Legislation Enacted in March 2010 Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Committee on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement
of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director) (estimating increased number of Americans to be insured by 2021
and stating one-third of the remaining uninsured will be unauthorized immigrants).27 THE COMMONWEALTH FuND, THE GERMAN HEALTH CAPE SYSTEM 1 (2011).
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are urgently ill). Moreover, the dependence in the Affordable Care Act on
an employer-based system is going to have significant cost implications. If
you are going to have a system that requires individual coverage, then it
must be affordable. You cannot make people do something that they
cannot do. That requires subsidence and some account of affordability.
And one needs that to be fleshed out.
28
Another issue that I wanted to pick up is the question: Why is
efficiency and cost an ethical issue, and not simply an economic one? My
answer to that is that if you want to meet everybody's needs in a fair way,
you are going to want a system that meets, per dollar spent, as many needs
as possible. It has to be efficient. If you do less than that, then it is less
fair than a system that meets more needs. Efficiency is then an ethical
concern, not simply an economic concern. Currently, the U.S. system has
bizarre incentives that create the highest unit prices in the world for health
care. 29  This is a real issue. The theory is that, if there is a highly
competitive economic system, then there should be lower prices. Although
the United States appears to be a competitive system, we have higher
prices. To determine why this is so, one must look at the incentive
schemes. While there have been some efforts made to address the issues of
cost, they are largely pilot programs and experiments.3° Thus, at this point,
it is unclear what their total impact will be.
This model closely resembles what was done in Massachusetts to
secure nearly universal coverage; it is the very same model on which the
Obama plan is shaped. In the Massachusetts model the cost issues were
not initially addressed, which produced significant strain in the system.
31
The model, however, did manage to produce approximately ninety-seven
28 See, e.g., Brendan Saloner & Norman Daniels, The Ethics of the Affordability of Health
Insurance, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 815 (2011).
29 See, e.g., INT'L FED'N OF HEALTH PLANS, 2010 COMPARATIVE PRICE REPORT: MEDICAL AND
HOSPITAL FEES BY COUNTRY 25 (2010), available at www.ifhp.com/documents/IFHPPrice_Report
2010ComparativePriceReport29112010.pdf; OECD HEALTH DATA, How DOES THE UNITED STATES
COMPARE 1 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3746,en_2649_33929_34971438
1_1_1 1,00.html; WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS: HEALTH EXPENDITURES tbl.7
(2009), available at http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/2009/en/index.html.
30 Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform and Cost Control, 7 NEw ENGL. J.
MED. 601, 602-03 (2010) (discussing the pilot programs and proposals to address the cost issues of the
Affordable Care Act).
31 See Kevin Sack, In Massachusetts, Universal Coverage Strains Care, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
2008, at Al (explaining that the increase in insurance coverage in Massachusetts consequently
increased the number of patients able to see doctors without actually increasing the number of doctors
in the Commonwealth); see also Peter Suderman, Massachusetts Health Program, Model for Obama's
Reform, Strains State Budget, DAILY CALLER (Jan. 10, 2010, 8:00 PM),
http://dailycaller.com/2010/01/1 0/massachusetts-health-program-a-model-for-obamas-national-reform-
strains-state-budget/ (explaining how the state mandated increase in insurance coverage means health
care spending will increase faster than the state's GDP).
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percent coverage, a very respectable number.12
On the other hand, there are real cost issues, which must now be
addressed. The current worry in the U.S. system is that the cost issues will
be much greater than those seen in Massachusetts, in part because, at the
time, Massachusetts had a higher level of insurance coverage than most of
the United States when its model was put in place.33 So if you go to places
like Texas, Alabama, and Mississippi, they have much higher levels of
uninsured,34 and the impact on the budgets of Medicaid expansion is going
to be huge. There are many complaints about the costs in the short run if
you do not address the overall costs. One of the devices for addressing
costs in the Affordable Care Act is the introduction of significant funding
for comparative effectiveness research.35 But-this goes to the third issue,
the issue about death panels-built into the law were restrictions on using
the information that comes out of this research for coverage decisions.36
We are investing in, and producing, a lot of information about the
comparative effectiveness of different technologies, but we cannot use that
information to make plausible coverage decisions in the system. This is a
little crazy in my opinion-why invest in information if you are not going
to use it?
Another puzzling issue about the Affordable Care Act is that it does
not address some of the problems about fairness in financing in a serious
way. I will not say much about this, but one has a fairer financing
arrangement when people who can afford to pay more, do pay more-not
just in absolute numbers, but perhaps even at higher rates. But even more
progressive financing was not something likely to happen given the
enormous pressures in our system to reduce tax rates for the wealthy and to
make the system more regressive in its overall financing. The impact of
cost reduction measures of the Affordable Care Act is minimal; it is not
going to change much regarding the way things are done in the system.
That is a battle for down the road if the Affordable Care Act survives court
challenges. As far as whether people will have more equitable benefits,
32 COMMONWEALTH HEALTH INS. CONNECTOR AUTH. & EXEC. OFFICE OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., THE TOP TEN FACTS ABOUT MASSACHUSETrS HEALTH CARE REFORM (2011) (noting that
with ninety-seven percent coverage, Massachusetts' coverage was by far the best in the nation).
33 Id. ("Massachusetts now has a 98% coverage rate, the best in the nation, by far.... Access to
care is far better in Massachusetts than nationally. For instance, in 2007, about 20% of the U.S.
population reported not getting or delaying needed medical care at some point in the previous 12
months.").34 ROBIN A. COHEN & DIANE M. MAKUC, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., STATE,
REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL ESTIMATES OF HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR PEOPLE UNDER 65
YEARS OF AGE: NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY 2004-2006 8 tbl.2 (2008), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsrO00 .pdf.
31 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e(b)(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (authorizing the establishment of the
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute to conduct comparative effectiveness research).36 1d. § 1320e-l.
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there is a commission trying to figure out what would be the essential
benefits of the exchange-based plans. Whether it meets my concerns about
what a fair process would look like remains to be seen, we simply do not
have much access to that information yet.
Finally, let me just say that the Affordable Care Act itself does not
explicitly address the inequalities in health status, except by pretending
that providing universal coverage will in fact flatten the gradient of health
in a society. But that pretense helps blind us to other factors affecting the
distribution of health in our population that are not addressed by the reform
at all.
In summary, I think we have improved coverage, but it is not
universal; immigration, for example, is one of the big holes. The cost
reduction involved in the process is modest, and I think inadequate.
Eventually, much stronger measures will have to be taken. I emphasize
that because the system is largely private we avoid what most European
systems would use as the main way of controlling costs, which is a better
balancing of monopoly and monopsony powers in a society. In the United
States, the pretense is that if we have a lot of separate insurance companies
competing with each other then we will be more competitive, but the
fundamental way in which most European countries have kept their costs
roughly fifty percent lower than U.S. costs is through this balancing of
monopoly and monopsony powers. We just do not do that. Indeed, in the
original Medicare Part D, the drug benefit that was passed under Bush, this
was prohibited.37 So, we explicitly say that you cannot do what all
countries do to keep their costs manageable.
There are some loose ends in the reform, like what to do about
abortion and birth control coverage, and these are going to be ongoing
issues given the political controversies in this country. But on the whole, I
do not think that there will be big battles about the benefits package that is
modeled, for the most part, on employer-based schemes that we already
have.
37 See Ice Miller LLP, Survey of Recent Developments in Health Law, 39 IND. L. REV. 1051, 1051
(2006) (explaining that Part D required sponsors to provide the service instead of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services).
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